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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4447
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 7168
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3506
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4816
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0623
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0311
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1288
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5399
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0304
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2050
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0092
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0639
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1358
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0459
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0319
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 6421
RUEAHLH/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFB/DIR FBI WASHDC

UNCLAS DAMASCUS 001171

SIPDIS

ATHENS FOR DHS
DEPT FOR INL/HSTC
DEPT FOR NPC PORTSMOUTH

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [CVIS](#) [CPAS](#) [KFRD](#) [KCRM](#) [CMGT](#) [ASEC](#) [SY](#)
SUBJECT: DAMASCUS FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGEMENT REPORT
JULY-SEPTEMBER 2007

REF: 05 SECSTATE 205073

The following is submitted in response to the Department's request in Reftel.

a. Country Conditions

(U) No change.

b. NIV Fraud

(SBU) Post continues to see an increase in Iraqi applicants as tourists, students, Hlb workers and medical cases. Post's FPU reviews all Iraqi documents if the applicant is going to be issued. Concerns over the authenticity of Iraqi documents and lack of standardization of Iraqi passports are mitigated by the fact that many Iraqis are found ineligible for nonimmigrant visas under 214(b).

(SBU) Several competing offices located near the Consular Section which offer a wide range of "services," claiming frequently to be affiliated with the Embassy. As a result, Post has developed a flyer which we distribute regularly to applicants and have posted around the Embassy to discourage applicants from using their services or being persuaded by the visa agents to lie on their applications.

c. IV Fraud

(SBU) Over the last quarter, FPU was able to compile information on fraud in ongoing IV files and IV files that have already been issued as a result of thorough NIV interviews and Post's ACS walk-in hour. Officers now email the FPM whenever this occurs in addition to noting the potential fraud in their case notes. This way if the IV has already been issued, the information is forwarded to the FPM at

NVC for further investigation and possible review of status. If it is an ongoing IV case, the FPM adds case notes to alert the interviewing officer and opens an FPU investigation if necessary.

(SBU) Post continues to see a dramatic increase in Iraqi IV cases, mainly due to the inability of Iraqis to travel to Cairo and Amman. The majority of Iraqi cases are fianc (K1) or spouse (K3, CR-1) cases. Fraud indicators involved in most cases include, but are not limited to, unreliable documents and limited documentation. Since some Iraqi applicants are not living in Syria, they do not generally travel with all of their identity documents and are unable or unwilling to go back to Iraq due to the current environment to get additional identity documents. Post has instituted a new policy by which FPU examines all Iraqi documents before the IV officer conducts the interview. Over the past quarter, FPU has identified several forged Iraqi passports of each series (S, G, H) and a fake MFA seal.

(SBU) Post initially identified several suspect Iraqi IDs from the northern regions of Iraq over the last quarter. Based on initial review, the FPU believed they were fraudulent because they differed from standard Iraqi IDs seen at Post. Based on further investigation and discussion with colleagues in Damascus, Post determined that the documents presented from the northern (Kurdish) areas of Iraq lack standardization and are of poor quality but are genuine IDs produced by Iraqi government offices.

d. DV Fraud

(SBU) FPU has not conducted any DV fraud investigations this quarter.

e. ACS and Passport Fraud

(SBU) Post has not had serious cases of passport or CRBA fraud this quarter.

f. Adoption Fraud

(SBU) Post has not has not conducted any fraud investigations on adoptions this quarter because we have not had any adoptions. Our adoption flier is currently in the clearance process.

g. Asylum and DHS Benefit Fraud

(SBU) Once again this quarter, Post has investigated documents for DHS in connection with naturalization proceedings, adjustment of status, labor certification, and political asylum. Most of the documents proved to be fraudulent, particularly divorce certificates and employment/work experience letters.

h. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities

(U) No change.

j. Staffing and Training

(SBU) Post continues to produce regular training documents and presentations on fake Iraqi documents encountered at Post. The FPU distributes the presentations to other colleagues at missions in Damascus as well as CA/FPP, NVC, posts in the region, DHS and other interested agencies. The FPU presentation on a fake G passport associated with an IV case at Post was one of the first fake G passports reported. Our powerpoint presentations can be obtained by writing to fpmdamascus@state.gov.

(SBU) Over the last quarter, the FPU has been coordinating with Airport Liaison Officers (ALOs) from other embassies in Damascus to obtain information on mala fide passengers who have been off-loaded either in Damascus. The FPU has produced various reports individual off-loaded passengers which were distributed to CA/FPP, Posts in the region, DHS and other interested agencies.